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Critical Phenomenology, Aesthetics and the Media “Manufacture of the 
Guilty (Fabricaciόn de culpables)” 
 




 The following is an exercise in what is coming to be known as critical 
phenomenology. We are borrowing the sense of critical phenomenology from Lisa 
Guenther and Gayle Salamon. Salamon argues that such an approach to phenomenology 
“reflects on the structural conditions of its own emergence”1 in a way different from 
classical phenomenology. Like critical theory, it is attuned to “its times and engaged with 
politics”2; however it presupposes that critical theory may offer “a supplement to a 
phenomenology in particular and to philosophy in general through its engagement…[what] 
we have too often dismissed as [being] to the side of ‘real’ philosophical concerns.”3 Lisa 
Guenther, for her part, provides six crucial paths of approach to critical phenomenology, 
of which we will focus on the first, third, and fourth: the posing of questions within a 
context qualifiable as a “crisis”; a “historically-grounded study of particular lifeworlds,” 
which does not preclude quasi-transcendentals—conditions of possibility that arise from  a 
material context although they are not limited to it. Finally, critical phenomenology 
addresses power and its modes of analysis in an ‘interested’—i.e., engaged—way.4 We 
 
1 G. Salamon, “What’s Critical about Critical Phenomenology?” in Puncta: Journal of Critical 
Phenomenology, 2018, vol. 1, no. 1. 
https://journals.oregondigital.org/index.php/pjcp/article/view/PJCP.v1i1.2. Consulted 1 March 2021. 
Hereafter WCCP.  
2 Salamon cites Wendy Brown in WCCP. Also see her performance of critical phenomenology in The Life 
and Death of Latisha King: A Critical Phenomenology of Transphobia (New York: New York University 
Press, 2018). 
3 WCCP, p. 13. 
4 Lisa Guenther, “Six Senses of Critique for Critical Phenomenology,” forthcoming in Puncta: Journal of 
Critical Phenomenology, special issue on the Collegium Phænomenologicum 2019 sessions on critical 
phenomenology,” summer 2021. Hereafter SSCP. There are additional senses emerging for critical 
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embrace its élan as a practice, a kritikē tekhnē consisting of “situated, 
motivated…questioning [that] is more interested in responses and response-ability than in 
definitive answers or solutions.”5 
 Our study seeks to perform a critical phenomenology as a “practice of freedom.” 
We begin with the narrative of Israel Vallarta, a detainee in a Mexican high security prison 
who came down with COVID 19 in May 2020. We explore how the prisoner came to be 
incarcerated and, with that, the crucial functioning of two systems6: the first, called 
duopolio, composed of the increasingly hybridized relationship between television and the 
executive branch of government in Mexico notably. The second, and conflictual, 
relationship between the justice system (attorney general and the courts) and television, 
together with social media. We proceed from Walter Lippmann’s concept of the 
manufacture of consent, albeit now under neoliberalism. We define neoliberalism, above 
all, as “a particular organization of capitalism…evolved to protect [the latter] and to reduce 
the power of labour [which] is achieved by means of social, economic and political 
transformations imposed by internal forces.”7 At the level of governance, these 
transformations are aptly illustrated by the operation of the duopolio and, in the present 
case, the derivative phenomenon denounced as la fabricación de culpables (“the 
manufacture of the guilty”). We investigate the latter to offer our readers a cautionary tale. 
 
phenomenology—and there will remain debates about how ‘phenomenological’ such an approach remains. 
Also see her more succinct “Critical Phenomenology” in 50 Concepts for a Critical Phenomenology, eds. 
Gail Weiss, Ann V. Murphy, Gayle Salamon (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2019), 11-16 
5 Guenther, SSCP 4. Guenther cites Wendy Brown, Edgework: Critical Essays on Knowledge and Politics 
(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press), 5. 
6 The term “dispositive” would be appropriate here, in the sense of possessing “the quality or function of 
directing, controlling, or disposing” of a group or institution, cf. Oxford English Dictionary, definition 3. 
7 Alfred Saad-Filho and Deborah Johnston, Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader (Ann Harbor, MI: Pluto Press, 
2005), 3. The definition specifies the forces as “the coalition between financial interests, leading 
industrialists…media barons…the top echelons of the civil service and the military, and their intellectual and 
political proxies.” Henceforth NCT.  
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Our hypothesis is that when one approaches television viewing through the framework of 
Husserl’s analytic image-consciousness, one encounters a novel form of what he called 
‘pictorial consciousness’ that moves between phantasy and memory, something made 
possible thanks to the ego’s unique ability to inhabit two worlds through shifting attention: 
a phantasy or mnemonic-associative one and a present, perceptual-associative one.8 We 
contend that the phenomenon of television, especially when supplemented with social 
media, can intertwine these two forms of consciousness in a potentially dangerous way.9 
This interlacing of what are distinct conscious modalities has decisive and material 
implications, notably in societies under neoliberalism.  
A final note in the form of a caveat. We recur extensively to Husserl’s threefold distinction 
between the picture-thing (Bildding), the pictorial-object (Bildobjekt), and the pictorial-
subject (Bildsujet), which early on provided him tools for analyzing the relationships 
between direct perception, perceptual recollection, and imaginative consciousness, 
especially in the form of phantasy images. This amounts to a return to Husserl motivated 
by Merleau-Ponty’s profound 1955 meditation on passivity and phantasy. Our particular 
problem, given contemporary media, is to take a step back, as it were behind Merleau-
 
8 Bernet points out that a reciprocity can exist between perception and phantasy, arguing “Just as phantasy is 
not derivable from a perception, so perception is not derivable from a phantasy. Nevertheless, it can be said 
that the essence of a real perception is co-determined by the possibility of its phantasial modification and 
also that it belongs to the essence of a real phantasy that it implies the possibility of an unmodified perception 
of its object….Thus, phantasy and perception can never be reduced one to the other.” See Rudolf Bernet, 
“Unconscious Consciousness in Husserl and Freud” in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, vol.1, 
(2002), p. 340. Hereafter UCHF.   
9 See Peter Shum’s acute observation that, when standing before a picture-thing I am implicitly aware that 
there is a kind of ‘conflict’ between the object presented on the canvas or sculpture and those that offer 
themselves to from the content of my surroundings. I do not mistake the image-object for the objects my 
worldly perception. However, as Husserl’s approach to imagination is increasingly tied to dynamics of 
intuitional reproduction, it proves the case that both memory and phantasy afford me intuitions that “seem to 
‘hover before us [vorschweben]’” Hua 23, 333, 405). Shum fairly interprets this hovering as “a kind of 
overlapping between what is given in the realm of phantasy and one’s actual perceptual field.” Peter Shum 
“The Evolution and Implications of Husserl’s Account of the Imagination” in Husserl Studies, Vol. 12 
(2015): 213-236, here 231. Hereafter EIHA.    
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Ponty’s profound analyses of perception and phantasy (notably in 1955), and disintricate 
what Merleau-Ponty presented in its lived intricacy.10 Hence, we contend that the study of 
televised media benefits from analytic categories developed initially in the period 1904 to 
1907 when Husserl’s phenomenology was what is now referred to as “static,” we will 
briefly return to the “genetic” phase toward the end.11  
 
10 See his analyses in “Le délire: Gradiva” and “Le cas Dora” in Intuition/La passivité: Notes de cours au 
Collège de France, ed. D. Darmaillacq, C. Lefort, S. Ménasé (Paris: Éditions Belin, 2003), 224-248. In 
English Institution and Passivity: Course Notes from the Collège de France (1954-1955), trans. Leonard 
Lawlor (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2010). This is Merleau-Ponty’s reconceptualization 
of Freud’s 1905 Dora case in light of the imbricated levels of perception, imaginary perception, and 
hallucination (e.g., Dora “sees” the world through her father’s eyes), and of Freud’s commentary on the novel 
Gradiva, which psychoanalysis approached as phantasy and the return of repressed childhood memories. 
Merleau-Ponty reads it, again, as the impact of phantasy on lived, intuited reality, and our inability to recover 
certain childhood memories. Merleau’s analyses effectively disrupt Freud’s nosological model. However, 
they do not provide analytical tools of the value, notably for moving images consisting of live news, 
rebroadcasts, and advertisements. The initial underlying question will thus be to what extent we can approach 
televised images as “image consciousness,” what happens to the belief in their reality when conflicts about 
the latter arise, and finally what becomes of a succession of image consciousness when it is cut across with 
‘phantasy’ images from advertising (new cars, beauty products, erotic escapes, travel, etc.). 
11 See Eduard Marbach, “Edmund Husserl: Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory (1898-1925), 
review in Husserl Studies, Vol. 28 (2012): 225-237, here 233 and hereafter “Edmund Husserl.” A 
comprehensive study would take up hereafter and examine the emergence of genetic phenomenology, which 
can be traced as far back as to some of the appendices (circa 1910) to the lectures on The Consciousness of 
Internal Time. At around the same time, the theme of phantasy would shift away from image presentation 
toward an “analytical distinction between two forms of presentation, phantasy and image consciousness” (p. 
229, emphasis added). The distinction disrupted what was initially two parallel, intuitive acts. The new 
approach to his conception of “phantasy” flowed out of the time consciousness studies and argued that while 
a phantasy entailed some kind of presentification or making present of (aspects of) a past perception, it arose 
and unfolded without any position concerning its reality, its having-happened-there-and-then. Phantasy thus 
presents… something. But unlike image consciousness that enlivens and spurs our imagination (often 
synonymous with phantasy) to enter the scene of the painting, phantasy just presents. I have no need to 
believe in it. It is a ‘neutral’ mode of presentification. The implications of the shift in Husserl’s 
phenomenological approach to image consciousness and phantasy are significant and tied to modalities of 
presentification that Husserl explored in light of the flow of imbricated threefold consciousness (now-
moments, retentions, and protentions or anticipations). A phantasy perceptually re-produces something, it 
presents it as if it were occurring and again as if in its proper surroundings and moment. By contrast, image-
consciousness is complex intentionality: it presents its ‘reality’ not as if it were our reality, but as it were next 
to the reality in which we view it, and the two realities stand together in their respective spaces, without 
merging and with the image “exhibiting” (darstellen) another—i.e., its particular—spatio-temporal reality. 
See the important discussions in R. Bernet and his “Individuation des objets réels ou imaginaires et la 
temporalisation de la conscience” in Conscience et existence. Perspectives phénoménologiques, Chapter 4, 
119-142 (on Husserl’s 1918 Bernau manuscripts on time and individuation). Hereafter IORI. Also Marco 
Cavallaro, “The Phenomenon of Ego-splitting in Husserl’s Phenomenology of Pure Phantasy” (i.e., of a 
quasi-perception in its own quasi-world, lacking all position-taking [Stellungnahme] on its reality), and 
Nicolas de Warren, “Tamino’s Eyes, Pamina’s Gaze: Husserl’s Phenomenology of Image-Consciousness 
Refashioned,” in eds. C. Ierna et al., Philosophy, Phenomenology, Sciences, Phænomenologica 200 (Berlin: 
Springer, 2010), 303-332. 
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II. The Story of Israel Vallarta 
On May 13, 2020, one of five prisoners in the high security sector of Puente Grande 
Prison (Jalisco, Mexico) was rushed to the emergency room of the Hospital General de 
Occidente. Unable to breathe or to speak, he tested positive for COVID 19 and put on a 
respirator. His symptoms had begun a month earlier in mid-April. Nevertheless, on May 
19th he was returned to population in Puente Grande. By then, four of the five inmates in 
his sector had died, leaving him to struggle alone for his life.  
The prisoner already enjoyed longstanding name recognition as well as the support 
of a prisoners’ rights activist going by the name “Mary.”12 Israel Vallarta Cisneros, the 
detainee, has been incarcerated for fifteen years. When COVID 19 symptoms spread 
through the prison, there were no medications available, and families were forbidden to 
provide anything to the inmates. Mary attempted to keep an eye on their status, notably 
that of Israel, whom she had befriended over the course of many years’ visits. When she 
phoned to inquire before May 13th, she was told he was healthy. Up until the day he choked 
on his speech, she believed that he was untouched by the virus.13 Puente Grande Prison 
observed a complete blackout on the status of the other inmates as well. The results were 
predictably catastrophic.  
Israel Vallarta was imprisoned on allegations of kidnapping and delincuencia 
organizada (organized crime). He was never convicted and has been in preventive 
 
12 See, for her account of Israel Vallarta’s imprisonment and illness “El Grito Desesperado (The Desperate 
Cry)” at https://codigomagenta.com.mx/articulo/con-tacones-entre-legos/contaconesentrelegos-israel-
vallarta-grito-desesperado. Codigo Magenta makes documentaries on human rights abuses, the Central 
American prison system, and Mexican politics. Also see the Canadian human rights organization, En Vero 
website (https://www.en-vero.org/caso-israel-vallarta-4-junio-2020/?fbclid=IwAR2DZvUyvBEENVxS4 
K4 LHp3shXUv2Lf0vlHFxx1VZSeh0tAPGVdyWjrNdM0). Both consulted 14 June 2020. 
13 Mary describes this in “El Grito” 2:10-3:15. 
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detention since 2005. He was a mechanic. At the time, he was dating a woman whose 
brother had brought suit against the owner of a shady private security contractor and won 
damages, whereupon he found himself caught up in the subsequent settling of accounts.14 
Israel’s story is hardly uncommon in Mexico. As we will see, it is also a horrific 
illustration of the gradual creation of parallel narratives: that presenting his lived reality 
and the extraordinary media montages that staged ‘live’ his arrest on national television. 
All of this promptly spread to radio and newspapers, motivating anxiety and a tenacious 
belief in his guilt among viewers and readers. In North America, such staging practices 
qualify as “fake news”; in Latin America, it is called la fabricaciόn de culpables. Though 
this phenomenon is presently less widespread in North America and Europe, the Vallarta 
case may still be taken as a cautionary tale in the age of “alternate truths,” corporate and 
social media. We will come back to the phenomenology of lived perception and media 
imagery after expanding the story of Israel Vallarta and Florence Cassez. For critical 
phenomenology, it raises the question of how the televised images and stories we perceive 
‘before our eyes’ mingle phantasy, image consciousness, and lived ‘reality’. The question 
is how to untangle such a commixture.  
II. The Cassez-Vallarta Case (2005-2013) and the “Duopolio” 
The bizarre narrative began on December 9, 2005, fifteen years earlier. A French 
national, Florence Cassez, was arrested together with Israel Vallarta on charges of 
kidnapping two adults and one child. Initially, there seemed to be solid reasons to suspect 
 
14 Emmanuelle Steels, El Teatro del Engaño: Buscando a los Zodiaco, La banda de secuestradores que nunca 
existió [The Theater of Deception: Searching for the Zodiac, The Band of Kidnappers that Never Existed] 
(Mexico City: Grijalbo/Random House, 2015; 2nd ed. 2018). 
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Vallarta and Cassez’s culpability. According to the televised narrative, at 6:47 a.m. an eight 
member SWAT team15 of the Mexican Federal Police (Agencia Federal de Investigation 
or AFI) burst into what was presented as Vallarta’s ranch house searching for—and 
finding—three victims. In what was said to be his home, they also discovered automatic 
weapons and a false partition hiding the abducted. Perhaps for the sake of living proof, the 
AFI agents had alerted two national television channels (TV Azteca and Televisa). These 
accompanied the rescue team to Vallarta’s ranch house. Once inside, two TV journalists16 
energetically interviewed Cassez and Vallarta, while Luis Cardenas Palomino, then Chief 
Director General of Police Investigations, held fast to the culprit, his hand visibly squeezing 
Vallarta’s neck during the televised questioning.17 The interrogations were both banal and 
suggestive. The journalist from Televisa asked Cassez: “Did you know there are hostages 
in this house?” And Vallarta: “Who paid you for this kidnapping and how much were you 
paid?” (He answered that he didn’t know.) After more questions receiving ambiguous 
responses, the same journalist queried, “Te duelle algo (Are you in pain)?” Vallarta turned 
his face to Palomino and murmured “Usted me pegό” (You’re the one who hit me”).18 These 
were the initial moments of what has come to be called the vergonzoso montaje (the 
disgraceful montage).  
 
15 The Grupo de Operaciones Especiales (GOPES), created in 1977, is classified as a non-military counter-
terrorist organization, that, predictably, receives its training from (and in) the United States and Columbia, 
with input from France and Spain. Their numbers appear to be classified information in Mexico 
(https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grupo_de_Operaciones_Especiales_(M%C3%A9xico). Consulted 15 June 
2020. 
16 Pablo Reinah of Televisa and Anna Maria Gomez of TV Azteca. 
17 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VPTsE-nlQ0g, 2:53 and 3:00-01. On the En Vero Youtube channel: 
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCLClBJoHVd7SSOUo2a3YN4Q (Consulted 12 June 2020). 
18 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VPTsE-nlQ0g, 2:55-2:59. Consulted 21 June 2020. 
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The live broadcast itself lasted forty minutes. It would be rebroadcast over the next 
three days. The accused kidnappers were taken from the house, thrust into a police van as 
the journalists continued barking questions—above all, at Florence Cassez. The presence 
of a French national added a measure of exoticism to the situation. More important was its 
dissemination, however. Broadcast simultaneously on the two channels’ morning news, the 
capture story would be routinely replayed each day on the mid-day and evening news. 
Now, while the two channels were nominally private, Mexican law requires that the State 
accord all television media a concession from the Secretaría de Comunicaciones y 
Transportes. The private and state sectors are thus dizzyingly interwoven. With media 
privatizations dating largely from the neoliberal reforms championed by President Vicente 
Fox (2000-2006), media connections with the Attorney General’s Office have been 
frequently documented. Private media has thrived in a network of connections with 
investors, national and international business, and the Mexican governmental division 
responsible for the Agencia Federal de Investigación. The latter, not unlike the American 
FBI, has operated with an unparalleled degree of autonomy from its inception in 2001, 
relative to the Attorney General’s Office. In Mexico, this is the outcome of a surreptitious 
drift, from a ‘president-headed’ duopolio (i.e., government by the executive in tandem with 
the television media) toward a novel duopoly or “media-government,” in which the major 
television stations exercise overweening influence on political initiatives.19  
 
19 As sociologist Omar Villarreal (Universidad Autόnoma Metropolitana, Xochimilco, UAM) observes: “It 
seems that television, in the new monopoly, has begun to put pressure on [the government], and to use its 
media power to obtain better advertising contracts, a series of benefits, as well as to perpetuate itself as a 
monopoly.” See interview with Omar Villarreal at the En Vero website. https://www.en-vero.org/derechos-
humanos-en-mexico-23-sept-2018/. Consulted 12 June 2020. Villarreal is writing his dissertation in the 
Divisiόn de ciencias sociales y humanidades (Division of Social Sciences and Humanities). 
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Questions about the degree to which this power-shift toward the mediatic or 
symbolic pole has spread to other states in Latin America—even to the United States—
exceed the framework of our study. Nevertheless, according the sociologist Omar 
Villarreal, the inverted duopoly in Mexico dates from the 1990s. If we accept the minimal 
claim, then, that televised media has had an unprecedented ascendency over public opinion 
for the past 30 years, two larger questions arise. First, why is it that public opinion so often 
proves vulnerable to dramatizations like the one staged by AFI’s raid on Vallarta’s ranch 
house? Second and along the same lines, why were the allegations of the AFI, that 
increasingly autonomous subdivision of the Attorney General’s Office, believed for 
significant periods of time, indeed for some seven years?  
In light of these questions, it is important to recall that social media began to 
flourish in Mexico around 2011. In the Cassez-Vallarta Case, and from the first days of 
their staged arrest, demonstrations and vox pop overbid on established journals and the 
many tabloids urging that the kidnappers be left to rot in prison.20 To be sure, Mexico is 
largely a democratic society, and one might expect skepticism about the corruption of 
leaders, their collaboration with capital markets and narco-trafficker cartels. Yet, in the 
Cassez-Vallarta case, very few popular critical comments emerged in the years between 
2006 and 2012. Instead, interviews with journalists from tabloids like La Prensa to serious 
papers like La Jornada and El Universal,21 not to mention public opinion polls, showed a 
broad base of support for Cassez-Vallarta’s alleged victims of the kidnapping. Though he 
 
20 See, for example, La Prensa 10 February 2011 (No. 30), cover story “Que se quede” (Let her [Cassez] stay 
[in prison]), urging against the extradition of Cassez to France.  
21 See, for La Prensa: https://www.la-prensa.com.mx/, founded 1928. For La Jornada, a Mexico City daily 




did not explicitly name them until 2009, everything that then-President Felipe Calderόn 
argued about criminality in Mexico had prepared the ground for unequivocal support for 
‘victims’.22 Popular support is understandable in a context where fear of kidnapping is 
rampant, and would be more so in cases where the present victims did not alter their own 
testimonies live before the cameras and on three different occasions…  
III. Governing by Opinion Manipulation or: Defining Reality under Neoliberalism 
There is a deeper problem here, which suggests that this affair should not be taken 
as peculiar to Mexico and Central America. The problem concerns neoliberalism’s impact 
on communications media, as well as the ongoing need of governments that tout their 
democratic credentials in order better to legitimate their policies23—especially those 
 
22 A decade before Trump in his inaugural speech, Calderόn argued, “Today, criminality aims to terrorize 
and paralyze society and government. Public insecurity threatens us all and has become the principal problem 
of states, cities, and whole regions. I know that restoring security will be neither easy nor rapid; it will take 
time, will cost much money, and even, unfortunately, human lives. But you may be sure that it is a battle in 
which I will be on the front lines…we Mexicans will triumph over criminality,” extract of Felipe Carderόn’s 
investiture speech, 1 December 2006. See L. Liderazgo, “Político de Felipe Calderόn (2006-2012)” in Foro 
internacional, Vol. 55, no. 1 (2015): 116-170, here p. 135. The same article reports that “During the first 
months of that year [now 2007] military operations were launched in [the following states:] Baja California, 
Guerrero, Nuevo Leόn, Tamaulipas, Veracruz, and Chihuahua. These were accompanied by aggressive 
speeches against criminality, and announcements of the capture of narco-traffickers,” p. 135. 
Two speeches from 2009 (March 9th and June 22nd) show Calderόn’s stalwartness on Cassez (and Vallarta). 
Following Sarkozy’s March 9th, 2009 visit, he resisted transferring Cassez to a French prison but agreed to a 
bi-national commission to study the conditions for such a transfer. A bi-national commission was created, 
but never met, though Calderόn referred to it in his subsequent speech to the nation. On June 22nd, he declared 
his formal opposition to her transfer. Accommodating Sarkozy’s demand would have amounted to 
repudiating the actions of the Federal Police, his right-hand man Genaro García Luna, and damaged 
Calderόn’s media image as ‘tough on crime’. https://www.jornada.com.mx/2009/06/24/politica/003n1pol. 
Consulted June 22, 2020. Nothing had changed by March 20, 2012, before the meeting of the Supreme Court, 
when Calderόn aggressively demanded that the Court respect only the victims, whose status had already been 
repeatedly questioned. See Tania Rosas, José Juan Reyes, and Jorge Monroy, “Calderόn pide justicia a la 
SCJN” in El Economista, March 19, 2012. https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/politica/-Calderon-pide-
justicia-a-la-SCJN-20120319-0082.html. Consulted June 22, 2020. 
23 We follow Saad-Filho and Johnston’s observation that “under the ideological veil of non-intervention, 
neoliberalism involves extensive and invasive interventions in every area of social life.” NCT, 4. The 
Jornada (Zacatecas edition) inquired, “Manipulating Public Opinion; The Attempt to Recover Power?” 
Ricardo Arteaga Anaya’s article observes that “[in] democratic societies, the exercise of power has been 
directly linked to public opinion, and ultimately to any tool apt to generate such opinion one way or another. 
Hence, in Mexico, one has sought to maintain control over the means of communication.” 
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concerning security and militarization—before public opinion. That is why the Cassez-
Vallarta case should serve as a cautionary tale, especially when the expanding role of social 
media promotes a reactive “chain logic of trolls and bots.”24 
Beyond the erstwhile manufacture of consent, we are confronted today with new 
struggles over the symbolic authority to define ‘reality’. Today around the reality ‘posit’ 
constellate video imagery, written pronouncements, and their various responses. This pre-
eminently concerns what Husserl strove to clarify between 1912 and 1918, when he 
expanded his arguments about the distinctions between actual perception (Gegen-
wärtigung, sometimes Wahrnehmung), image-object consciousness (Bildebewustsein), 
memories, and phantasies. To be sure, he was aware that there was a certain movement 
between lived perception, image consciousness, and phantasy, porosities that we will call 
interstices, variably open according to circumstances. We will return to this.25 The Cassez-
 
24 To wit, the more one reacts to a troll or bot’s message, whose dissemination is initially limited, the greater 
its visibility; with increased visibility comes repetition, retweeting and posting, and with the latter a 
heightening of the message’s credibility. As The Economist argued, “[t]he earliest reports of government 
involvement in nudging public opinion involve democracies, and new innovations in political 
communication technologies often come from political parties and arise during high-profile elections.” Cf. 
The Economist Spanish edition’s editorial: “Gobierno de México utiliza bots para manipular opiniones” 
https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/tecnologia/Gobierno-mexicano-utiliza-bots-para-manipular-opiniones-
estudio-20170718-0030.html. Consulted June 21, 2020. This related the results of a study by the 
Computational Propaganda Research Project (Oxford University), “A Global Inventory of Organized Social 
Media Manipulation,” Working Paper no. 2017.12, by Samantha Bradshaw and Philip N. Howard. The study 
covered the media in 28 countries. https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/troops-trolls-and-trouble-makers-a-
global-inventory-of-organized-social-media-manipulation. Consulted June 21, 2020. Also see the New York 
Times (https://www.nytimes.com/es/2017/12/16/espanol/opinion/alto-a-la-manipulacion-de-la-democracia-
en-linea.html). Consulted June 22, 2020. 
25 Our term “interstices” is indebted to Husserl’s complexification of acts of presentification 
(Vergegenwärtigung, making-present anew) as reproduction and its multiple modalities. He wrote of their 
ineinandergeflochtene Intentionalität [interwoven intentionality]. Additionally, presentification involves 
both the object or contents of a memory and the intentional acts themselves. In regard to what we call 
remembering and, given the dynamic nature of his concept of retentions ‘flowing back’ yet holding their 
specific position within flowing sequences of experience, Husserl adds (1912), “every reproductive 
modification is the reproduction of an internally ‘impressionally conscious’ experience: the reproduction 
itself is impressionally conscious” (PIM 402; Hua 23, 330). If I recall having perceived the town hall, for 
instance, I can reproduce my perception just as easily as I can attend, reproductively, to the act of seeing or 
aiming at the town hall. I can reflect on this and note how the perception comes back, and with what temporal 
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Vallarta case evinces one such interstice, between what actually occurred (which only the 
police and the accused saw) and what televised media presented as real events (images) 
would not be brought to light until 2012. It was then that the Mexican Supreme Court 
(SCJN) examined the original montage, as well as its effects on public opinion, subsequent 
media coverage, judicial processes, and on the lives of the persons incriminated.26 Before 
turning to Husserl, let us therefore look at the story presented by Televisa and TV Azteca. 
Florence Cassez was promptly handed over to the Special Victims’ Unit, headed 
by the Subprocuradía General de Investigación en Delincuencia Organizada in Mexico 
City. The media filmed her falter from the police van into the Unit. Israel Vallarta attracted 
less media interest. By trade an auto mechanic, he was a Mexican citizen, an Everyman to 
the cameras. What is more, he had confessed his guilt live and under the ‘eye’ of the rolling 
videos. During the raid, Cassez appeared disoriented and denied knowing anything about 
the kidnappings.  
On February 5, 2006, two months after their arrest, and while under preventive 
detention (arraigo), an extraordinary event occurred. During a live interview on Televisa 
with the Director of the AFI, Genaro García Luna, a detainee called the station contending 
that the Director’s story about Cassez and Vallarta was a fabrication. The arrest had not at 
all occurred on December 9th. It had taken place the day before under circumstances 
different from what the media presented as “en vivo (live and direct).” The caller was 
 
modification. This reflection, and my recalling the town hall take place in my consciousness; they too are 
“impressionally conscious” PIM 329, 474; Hua 23, 330, 402). They impact my impressional consciousness. 
But I can also imagine the town hall in one way or another as though it were now before me. Despite the 
resemblance between the reproduced town hall of recollection or presentification, and the phantasized town 
hall, a different “modification,” qua imagined, is required. I may also presentify or recollect my foregoing 
fantasy (PIM 212-213; Hua 23, 176-177)! These modalities are powerfully interwoven and impact each other. 
The implications of this for our sustained recourse to visual, and social, media are far-reaching.  
26 Zaldivar’s assertion of the autonomy of judicial decision-making in opposition to public opinion pressure.  
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Cassez herself. She had been watching the interview from detention, during which time 
she requested a phone on pretext of calling her mother and called Televisa directly. She 
had been emboldened by a journalist who listened to her experience and urged her to share 
it publicly.27 On the phone with Denise Maerker, who was hosting Garcia Luna, Cassez 
directly confronted his allegations, backing him up against a televised wall.28 He was 
obliged to acknowledge live that the SWAT team and the arrest were a media set-up, 
essentially a figment. Nevertheless, he insisted that it was the media’s fault, not that of the 
AFI. The report was made up, he said, “a petición de ustedes” (on your [the media’s] 
demand), but it was presented “just as it happened the day before,” he insisted. This 
disturbing revelation of “fake news” will prove important in our examination of the 
phenomenology of perception, images, and indeed of phantasy. Not even yet charged, 
Cassez and Vallarta remained in preventive detention without possible release, although 
for suspicion of delincuencia organizada (which includes kidnapping and blackmail in 
Mexico) there is no bail.  
Presumably to neutralize Cassez’s telephone charges and Garcia Luna’s televised 
admission, the alleged kidnap-victims revised their own testimonies on February 10th, five 
days later. Before she phoned the station, the victims did not discuss Cassez. One of them, 
the child’s mother, initially ventured that her son recognized Cassez’s voice but had never 
seen her. Following that, the mother changed course, saying that she herself had heard 
Cassez’s voice on multiple occasions, and that she had been raped by Vallarta and his 
abettor. The narrative revision gave ample justification for the AFI’s mobilizing a SWAT 
 
27 The journalist was Yuli Garcia, who worked first for Televisa, then for Milenio TV. 
28 For discussion of this event, see Eric Dussart (with Florence Cassez), A l'ombre de ma vie, Prisonnière de 




rescue team, and few seemed to notice that the mother’s testimony had significantly 
changed. This would not be the only time that the victims altered their televised account of 
reality, nor would it be the last time that Director Garcia Luna would make the news.  
IV. Corporate Media Reality Steerage and its Juridical Impacts 
Cassez was tried, found guilty, and sentenced to 96 years in prison. Following her 
first appeal in 2009, the sentence was reduced to 60 years’ incarceration. Vallarta was never 
sentenced as he has never had a trial, a matter to which we will return. Thus, for fifteen 
years he has been imprisoned sin sentencia and ‘preventively’ in the high-security prison, 
Puente Grande. Following international protest and a scarcely anticipated change of 
attitude among Mexican journalists, lawyers, and a handful of academics, Cassez was 
released after seven years’ incarceration on January 23, 2013. Her release was obtained 
thanks to a Supreme Court decision. In contrast to the television broadcast, the procedure 
of the Court amounted to a struggle over how fairly to establish the reality of the case. 
Initially, in March 2012, Justice Arturo Zaldívar presided over the penal chamber of the 
Court. After studying the case, he castigated the collaboration between Mexican media and 
the federal police, which had produced a “corrupting effect” on the accused’s right to due 
process of law and the presumption of innocence. As if himself striking up against the wall 
of the televised montage, Zaldívar concluded that there was ultimately no way to determine 
the reality of the events as presented. Worse, the alleged victims of the kidnapping refused 
to comment on the truth-content of the SWAT raid footage. In response, the five Supreme 
Court Justices deadlocked two-to-two around Zaldívar’s petition (proyecto), with one 
abstaining. Cassez remained imprisoned. The following year, another petition was drawn 
up by a different judge, on new grounds but with a similar conclusion. Zaldívar voted 
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against it and it was withdrawn.  Analyzing the montage frame by frame, he argued that 
remained no chance of establishing the slightest element of reality, much less the guilt or 
innocence of the accused. Astoundingly, a year later, Zaldívar’s proyecto was adopted, this 
time by three votes against two. At that point Cassez was released and she returned to 
France. Vallarta, on the other hand, has remained in preventive detention for fifteen years 
because he never had an ‘adjudicatable’ case.29 
Two brief remarks about the case are in store. Unlike similar stories of trumped-up 
charges and imprisonments, four books and many articles analyzed Cassez-Vallarta 
between 2006 and 2018.30 Moreover, Cassez’s incarceration led to a diplomatic conflict 
with France, stoked by Nicolas Sarkozy’s media-covered visit to Calderón on March 9, 
2009. The tabloids and, from 2011 onward, social media fanned the flames of the foreign 
intrigante and “mastermind” kidnapper,31 whose face was disseminated by all the major 
newspapers—with varying expressions of malice, ill-will, or pain.32  
 
29 A hearing may be called by a judge, the accused, or indeed by the prosecution. In Vallarta’s case, each 
time a hearing was arranged, an insufficient number of witnesses (i.e., the victims, the arresting police—
although not witnesses, as there were none) attended. Consequently, his trial was blocked and no decision 
possible. It may seem surprising that no one from the SWAT team would testify, and that two of the victims 
were actually sent out of Mexico, in February 2006, to San Diego (United States), ‘for protection’ (both 
returned periodically to Mexico thereafter). By 2011, a ‘compensatory’ narrative was circulating that the 
entire Vallarta family had formed a kidnapping organization with wide-ranging activities. The rumor was 
obtained from David Orosco under torture. See note 15. 
30 Emmanuelle Steels, El teatro del Engaño (see n. 3); José Reveles, El Affaire Cassez: La indignante 
invención de culpables en México (2013); Luis de la Barreda, Culpable: Florence Cassez, El Juicio del Siglo 
(Mexico City: Grijalbo/Random House, 2014), and Jorge Volpi. Una novela criminal (Madrid: 
Alfaguara/Penguin Random House, 2018).  
31 Testimony of David Orozco, today deceased, whose taped witness about the kidnapping band, “Zodiac,” 
argued that Cassez was the brains behind the operation. This witness, arriving as if out of nowhere, was 
‘discovered’ (tortured), and interviewed by the same Luis Cardenas Palomino. Note that in 2009, the AFI, 
headed by Cardenas Palomino, literally engulfed the Policía Ministerial Federal, affording the AFI’s most 
influential members a promotion. In 2010, Palomino became the chief of the Division of Regional Security, 
responsible for all arms, drug, and organized crimes in Federal areas of Mexico. He is presently under 
investigation for money laundering by the Mexican Attorney General’s Office.  
32 Such images were widespread (see note 20 supra) and continued up to 2013, the year of Cassez’s release. 
See El Sol de Irapuato’s article “Indigna al Víctimas, Liberaciόn de Cassez (An indignity to the victims, 
liberation of Cassez),” 24 January. 
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Secondly, the “manufacture of the guilty” is a concept coined by Anne Vigna, a 
French journalist working in Mexico and Brazil.33 Over the last two decades an abundant 
literature has grown up (in Spanish, French, and English) on media depictions of crime and 
criminal justice in Latin America. While English-speaking readers are familiar with cases 
like that of the Move in West Philadelphia and the dubious charges (illegal possession of 
firearms and threat of terror) levelled against the nine who survived the bombing and were 
incarcerated,34 it remains that the plea-bargaining system in U.S. courts is not generally 
recognized as a systematic process of fabrication. Certainly, an entire study could be 
devoted to North American form(s) of guilt manufacture—not to mention of duopolio. As 
the Mexican Supreme Court acknowledged, the Cassez case represents a protracted 
struggle over Due Process versus police-and-media incrimination and their virtual trials. It 
has already been argued that democratic government in Mexico relies heavily on media 
manipulation of popular opinion35—which finally tipped the duopolio in favor of imagery 
over presidential rhetoric.36  
The debate comes down to how and what we see through the video camera and 
subsequently, in social media. We argue that this calls for critical phenomenological 
resources, some of which can be found in Husserl’s exploration of image consciousness, 
 
33 Anne Vigna and Alain Devalpo, Fabrica de Culpables: Florence Cassez y Otros Casos de la Injusticia 
Mexicana (Mexico City: Grijalbo, 2010). 
34 See, for example, William K. Stevens, “Police Drop Bomb on Radicals’ Home in Philadelphia,” The New 
York Times, May 14, 1985 and for the aftermath of the trial that ensued against the City, Don Terry, 
“Philadelphia Held Liable for Firebomb Fatal to 11,” The New York Times, June 25, 1996. 
35 Forbes’ Mexican edition was more assertive: “En México hay medios, en especial televisivos, que 
transforman la información en manipulación, según sean las circunstancias y sus intereses económicos o 
politicos (In Mexico, there are media, in particular television, that transform information into manipulation 
in function of the circumstances and their economic or political interests).” 
https://www.forbes.com.mx/donde-termina-la-informacion-y-comienza-la-manipulacion/. Consulted June 
21, 2020. 
36 See Melanie del Carmen Salgado Lopez, I Declare War against Whom? Calderόn’s War Discourse against 
Narco-trafficking (Unpublished thesis, Universidad Nacional Autόnoma de Mexico, 2012).  
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memory, and phantasy. For, a remarkable feature of television news coverage—notably 
when juxtaposed to the intercalated advertisements—is that news should be approached 
not simply as ‘fake’ or ‘fiction’ as for the way in which it blends the aforementioned image 
consciousness, memory, and phantasy. There are significant funds for this in Husserl’s 
twenty-seven-year engagement with these themes, ever in light of how we constitute 
reality. We therefore turn now to his phenomenological distinctions.   
V. Husserl and the Phenomenology of Perception, Image Consciousness, and 
Phantasy 
Husserl began taking notes on phantasy, image consciousness, and memory even 
before publishing the Logical Investigations (1900-1901).37 Each group of texts in the 
Gesammelte Werke (Hua 23) provides a sense of his evolution at a given epoch. The 
lectures of 1904 to 1905 predate the significant modification in his approach to perception, 
image-consciousness, and phantasy that takes place as Husserl integrates his 
phenomenology of inner time consciousness with the former (1905-1909).  For example, 
in the early lectures, Husserl contrasted the reality of lived sensation with the non-reality 
of phantasy sensations. Perception, he argued, is “presentation” (Gegenwärtigung); it gives 
us an object specifically, from one angle or more as we walk around it; it is leibhaft, 
fulsome and in-person. Possessed of multiple horizons, an object perceived live is part of 
my reality here and now. Certainly, perception occurs together with memories, 
 
37 Edmund Husserl, Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory (1898-1925), trans. John Barnett Brough 
(from Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung. Zur Phänomenologie der anschaulichen Vergegenwärti-
gung. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1898-1925), Husserliana XXIII, ed. Eduard Marbach [The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1980]) (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005). Hereafter PIM with page numbers from the English followed 
by the German. We have adopted the use of “presentification” in the place of Brough’s “re-presentation,” to 
avoid confusion with “representation” and philosophies thereof. 
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expectations, judgments, and sometimes phantasy. But the object I perceive has an 
“identity”; it remains identically the same across my perceptual acts and can be 
communicatively shared with others. As such I believe in it spontaneously, until some 
conflict leads me to doubt what I see or hear. By comparison with phantasy, I have no 
particular freedom to modify perception itself, as the latter is lived experience that is not 
subjective in the way that a phantasy is my creation. All this is relatively uncomplicated. 
Note that in the lectures the pivot of Husserl’s distinction between perceptual reality and 
phantasy is the conception of lived sensation, presentation with identity and belief, and the 
absence of freedom to improvise.38  
What Husserl called “image consciousness” (Bildbewusstsein) applied essentially 
to paintings and photographs. As we will see, it is also relevant to moving images. Unlike 
presentation or lived perception here and now, which he equated with ‘taking-as-true’ 
(literally Wahr-nehmung), image consciousness resembles phantasy and memory in that it 
is a making present or presentification (Vergegenwärtigung).39 It makes an absent object 
present, but unlike phantasy or memory, adheres to some physical substrate like paper, 
canvas, or indeed, a screen. Also unlike perception, which concerns and means itself, image 
consciousness is complex: it has three parts, like a sign: the “physical image” or thing 
(Bildding) on which the image is set; the “representing” or “image object” (Bildobjekt) 
which is the picture as depicting, while the object for which it stands, is the “image subject” 
 
38 Compare this with Merleau-Ponty’s argument in his 1945 exploration of lived space, “To perceive is 
suddenly to commit to an entire future of experiences in a present that never, strictly speaking, guarantees 
that future; to perceive is to believe in a world. It is this opening to a world that makes perceptual truth 
possible, or the actual realization of a Wahr-nehmung, and permits us “to cross out” the preceding illusion, 
to hold it to be null and void.” The Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Donald Landes (Oxon and New 
York: Routledge, 2012), 311. Thanks to Sepehr Razavi for suggesting this passage. 
39 Also see Rudolf Bernet, UCHF in note 8 supra.  
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(Bildsujet). When I watch a televised SWAT raid on a house, the physical image is my TV 
or computer screen, which escapes notice until something goes awry with it. The dynamic 
image object includes the police entry into the house and the subsequent interrogation. The 
image subject here is more complicated: it certainly denotes the absent kidnappers (i.e., 
who are not physically in my living room), etc., yet whom I nevertheless see ‘before me’ 
live—and, even threateningly, in my vicinity. This is why what are called live broadcasts 
belong to image consciousness whose object is nevertheless a Fiktum or Schein (a figment 
or a semblance) as Husserl would say (PIM 22, 59, 76; Hua 23, 21, 54, 71).40 
Now, the physical image or substrate tends to awaken our awareness of the image 
itself; we might observe that this canvas is cracking or the screen is dull. Its physicality 
lends stability to the “image object,” though it is an open question whether screens work 
consistently like canvases or photographic paper (viz., their ability to vanish may be 
greater, depending on use and circumstances).41 By contrast, phantasies have no such 
 
40 But this figment cannot be separated from some memory, some presentification, lest it not be a viable 
image: “if the conscious relation to something depicted is not given with the image, then we certainly do not 
have an image. This conscious relation, however, is given through that specific consciousness belonging to 
the presentification of what does not appear in what does appear” (PIM 32; Hua 23, 31). See Marbach, 
“Edmund Husserl” (2012, 232). Thus, this figment owes its force and even vivacity in our case, to the 
connections it has with past perceptions (presentations) that may or may not be presentified with it.  
41 By the time Husserl had carried phenomenology from a static approach to a genetic one, we find new and 
important notions of “affect-consciousness” and “the passivity of the life of consciousness.” Characteristic 
of the life of the psychological ego, affects may or may not attract the attention and focus of that ego. More 
important for the question of screens and televised media is that frequently, when watching, or absorbed in, 
a screen, ‘I’ am in a state “in which the ego is present,” albeit without directly attending to the scene. But 
there are also affects from which the ego is, at least temporarily, absent. “The wakeful egoic life is 
distinguished from the egoic life that is not awake, from the ego that is ‘in a stupor’ in the broadest sense” 
(Hua 11, 364). Part of the power of image-consciousness when mediated by a screen amounts to the 
“background of non-wakefulness” that accompanies wakeful life such that while an object is noticed, many 
other things are co-given “in a second or third order co-grasping” (Hua 11, 363-364). These include affects 
and values, retentional chains, etc. Thus argued Husserl as his genetic phenomenology was exploring active 
and passive syntheses. Note that from early on, the specificity of image-consciousness was that of a “making-
present of a non-appearance in an appearance, a rendering visible of the invisible,” as Nicolas de Warren 
reminds us (see TEPG, 306). It is the effectivity of non-appearance that concerns us here; arguably, only a 
part or aspect of “non-appearance” comes to appear in an image. 
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physical instigators; they do not awaken concern with image objects because they stand as 
it were in the place of the image object. 
Image consciousness and its three components amount to figments, even though, 
for Husserl, they cannot be equated with phantasies. The image object, or what I see on my 
screen, is clearly the only component of image consciousness that appears. The physical 
image is easily overlooked and the image subject is clearly elsewhere. Despite this, the 
Fiktum does appear, and sometimes powerfully. In watching it, we hardly attend to the 
absence of the image subject, because it is meant, as if pointed-to (PIM 20, 25; Hua 23, 19, 
23-24).42 It is enough that the image object be there, then, that we start to “see-into” it. Just 
as I see a head in the plaster cast, or Husserl’s example of a “woman of superhuman size” 
in a two-foot statue of the Madonna (PIM 48, 582; Hua 23, 44, 487-488),43 my seeing-into 
entails more than deriving a form that I recognize. It opens to phantasy and value 
conceptions, “anomalous appearances”: the two-foot-high Madonna may feel to me as “of 
superhuman size” (though certainly the form, the physical mother and child would not have 
been) (PIM 48; Hua 23, 44). By extension and depending on viewers’ circumstances and 
memories, a live transmission of the arrest of kidnappers will be imbued with a range of 
value and mnemonic associations.  
 
42 Husserl calls the intuitive ‘knowing’ that an image means someone or something else “depictive 
consciousness” and “a consciousness of difference” (PIM 22; Hua 23, 20). This consciousness is immediate; 
it does not require reflection, though reflection may clarify the depiction. The intuitive “consciousness of 
difference” is crucial for phenomena of racialization, perception of ‘physiognomies’, etc., all built up through 
the sedimentation of sensation, phantasies, and image consciousness. 
43 Just as ‘I’ readily do during television news and ‘reality’ TV series, “I can live in the image consciousness 
of this Madonna by Michelangelo, and I then ‘feel’ through the flesh and the inner life, while I do not at the 
same time see a color” (PIM 582; Hua 23, 487-488, emphasis added). 
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This phenomenon of seeing-in with value and phantasy takes a unique form in the 
case of actions like police raids.44 Depending on the viewers, and supposing them to be 
citizens apprehensive of repeated kidnappings, seeing-into the figures of the kidnappers 
will be imbued with affects and sedimented memories of abduction (rumored, witnessed, 
or lived), violence, fear-objects like cartels, police, etc.45 This is part of why televised news 
can be particularly consequential. Forgetting the support, overlooking the awareness that 
the image objects are indeed fictions (PIM 612, 698; Hua 23, 511, 580)46—the news is 
 
44 In addition to news broadcasts, there is the proliferation of ‘reality’ series. Consider the infamous seasons 
of “Cops,” which began on the Fox network, then passed to Paramount, to run for thirty-three seasons. After 
years of resistance, it was cancelled in 2020 following protest around the killing of George Floyd. Beyond 
this constructed ‘reality’, we can include the TV reality series of Briton, Chris Ryan (“Ultimate Force,” 2002-
2006; “Strike Back” 2010-2020), which is representative of the romanticization of paramilitary forces and 
police. Closer to home is the Dick Wolf Law and Order franchise. Impressed by these shows, Genaro García 
Luna (Director of the AFI in 2005), subsequently launched a Mexican version of “Law and Order,” “El 
Equipo,” on Televisa in 2011. Reality televised, or allegedly so, joined televised ‘reality’—both of which 
proved to be fictive. 
45 At almost the same time, in the Ideas II (1912-1917), affects played a significant role as motivating the 
ego, conferring value, inciting the subject to comport itself toward objects or persons. Although, for Husserl, 
affects are intentional and play a preponderant role in tasks of object constitution, they also sediment through 
“a passive habituality in the ego” (Hua 4, 310). Sedimentation is crucial here and although the ego that is 
understood as the unity of the transcendental and the psychic egos “remains identically the same” through 
humours and affective states, conviction nevertheless could prompt one to change oneself (Hua 4, 311). So 
certain affective states have a privileged relationship to judgements and acts.  
46 Husserl writes, with a wax museum or theater play in mind: “Suppose that we immerse ourselves in what 
is intuited, specifically, in one of the contending apperceptions, hence in the apperception of the ‘king’ in the 
theatrical performance, without entering into the other apperception and without forming, in the transition, 
the consciousness of conflict (just as in the transition from immersion in one of two similar things [emphasis 
added] to immersion in the other, we can have ‘sensuous similarity given to us without producing the 
consciousness of coinciding…). Now if we do that, the negation of actuality, the active rejection…is missing 
on the side of the actively apperceived object, while nonetheless within the boundaries of passivity we are 
not conscious of the intuited object in a normal perception.” In short, “the [reality- or phantasy-] positing that 
belongs essentially to the uninhibited apprehension…is cut off by a counter-characteristic [Gegencharakter]” 
(PIM 613; Hua 23, 511, emphasis added). So too for television watching. I may have a sense of a “sensuous 
similarity” between what I watch and (important) aspects of my daily life, with its population of things and 
people. But I require neither identity nor an active suspension of conflict to “immerse” myself in the 
spectacle. Disturbingly, when commercial television news is interspersed with advertisements, ‘I’ must make 
the spontaneous transition from ‘the live’ and the ‘factual’ that news is supposed to be, to the phantasmatic 
that are ads, playing on my desires and insecurities. With the increase in ads’ quantity and frequency, the 
“uninhibited actuality” of lived perception here and now is and is not cut off by “a counter-characteristic”—
and two ‘realities’, both perceptual (one of the TV room, the other of the TV news), are as if invaded by the 
phantasmatics of the advertisements. As Husserl says, “however much experience speaks against it…I 




‘live’ after all—and seeing-in, we participate in constituting ‘bad guys’ and ‘good guys’. 
This is one of the interstices between image consciousness and phantasy, because beneath 
the succession of images, powerful affects can open a certain freedom to phantasize and 
motivate doing so through mnemonic association (PIM 297-298, 466-470; Hua 23, 241-
243, 394-396).47 In that case, and despite everything I know of (my everyday) reality, I 
may unreflectively add the phantasy element of “supposing it were thus [‘Gesetzt, dass es 
so wäre’]” (697; 580). So much for the mechanics of the ‘manufacture of guilt’. This is 
borne out in the criminological literature concerned with the relation between commercial 
and digital media, public opinion, and fiction—from print to series to the web. As 
criminologists C. Greer and R. Reiner observed recently, “The fact/fiction distinction [in 
television] has become ever more fluid, with the emergence of what is usually referred to 
as ‘reality television’ or ‘infotainment’…. The media and criminal justice systems are 
penetrating each other increasingly, making a firm distinction between ‘factual’ and 
‘fictional’ programming tenuous.”48  
Interstices notwithstanding, it is important in a world of corporate and social media 
to heed Husserl when he qualifies the image object as a “nullity” (PIM and Hua 23 § 22).49 
 
47 Rudolf Bernet discusses the crucial distinction between memory and phantasy—two distinct acts and 
modalities of consciousness—underscoring that phantasy comes without positing or taking a stance as to its 
reality. Indeed phantasy “knows itself as phantasy because it is an inner reproductive consciousness of a 
(quasi-) perception.” As such, phantasy precisely entails “the creative freedom” that open[s] up the possibility 
of its free conscious presentation.” This often allows us to take critical distance on our intuitive presentations 
and recollections (UCHF 339, 341).  
48 C. Greer and R. Reiner, “Mediated Mayhem: Media, Crime and Criminal” in Oxford Handbook of 
Criminology, eds. M. Maguire, R. Morgan, and R. Reiner (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 245-
278. These are part of the conclusions drawn from their diachronically extended study of print and electronic 
media, including news, reality TV, crime series, and novels between W.W. II and 2014. 
49 Husserl is aware of the near paradox of a nullity that is here and now perceived, vividly, as present. “…[I]n 
a peculiar way…the image object does triumph, insofar as it comes to appearance. The apprehension contents 
[what I see as I look at image, its support, and my surroundings] are permeated by the image object 
apprehension [pre-eminently the TV image object apprehensions]; they fuse into the unity of the appearance. 
But the other apprehension is still there; it has its normal, stable connection with the appearance of the 
surroundings.” Hence the paradox: “The surroundings are real surroundings; the paper [or the screen], too, 
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In the age of dynamic images and sound, the nullity is there, before us. It exists even as it 
does not exist, the Schein is present but not “actual,” as he put it. Yet in another sense, such 
nullities can be decisive. Body cameras and cellular filming provide a perception as-if ‘in 
the flesh’, which alone may introduce conflict into police, and other potentially partial, 
accounts. No need to add that the socio-political and juridical implications of this are 
significant. For Husserl, however, conflict is functionally important in another way: it 
actively annuls image objects. In the Cassez-Vallarta case, it took three months’ 
incarceration before Cassez was able to call Televisa and introduce ‘live’ conflict into both 
the raid video and Garcia Luna’s narrative.50 While the incident is remarkable in itself, 
what is required to introduce epistemic conflict into accounts via videos or witnessing by 
subaltern and racialized people is no doubt much greater.  
In phenomenology, conflict is socially and materially complex. Husserl 
distinguishes between conflicts with surroundings (that may appear as actual) and those 
with the subject of the imaging. In simple terms, the image object of image consciousness 
gives us an “ideal world [ideelle Welt]” (PIM 50; Hua 23, 46) complete with its own 
relative space, time, and rhythm (PIM 646; Hua 23, 536-537). In many cases, there is no 
fitting the image world into our lived surroundings. At least by virtue of its physical support 
(screen, canvas, frame, pedestal, etc.), it is not of them, not perceptual in a direct way. Yet, 
in the case of televised news we often invest image objects with belief. Only when and if 
some conflict intervenes do we suspend our belief in many of them—and sometimes not 
 
is something actually present. It is therefore merely an ‘image’; however much it appears, it is a nothing (ein 
Nichts)” (PIM 50; Hua 23, 46). But for the two nexuses, that of reality and that of the images, to stand fully 
apart, there needs be reflection—or critical awareness. 
50 Cassez was able to do this because she was in a medium security prison whereas Vallarta was already 
under high security incarceration.  
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even then. The problem here is not one, say, of those competing perceptions where I focus 
on the object and attempt to determine who or what I saw (e.g., ‘was that a dog or was it a 
wolf?’). Instead, conflicts with surroundings or with the image subject nourish our 
awareness of the image object per se. In that case, reflecting on image consciousness can 
be like awaking from a dream. Or it may provide value, in and as itself, for the ‘facts’ 
attaching to an image subject that was present and filmed (image consciousness), but ‘is’ 
no more. Consider the value contributed by cell phone recordings of police violence…and 
murders.51 
Awaking from a dream may not suit our habits or desires, any more than living in 
the midst of such tensions. In the case in question, TV viewers tended not to notice 
Cardenas Palomino’s hand painfully squeezing Vallarta’s neck. Competing narrative and 
phantasy fragments may have played a role in this blindness (‘he’s a kidnapper, one must 
hold on to him’). It did not give way until journalists began to cast doubt on the entire 
story,52 years after Cassez’s phone call to Televisa. Notwithstanding, Husserl argues that 
image consciousness actually lives from these tensions; they are its condition of possibility, 
 
51 This is again because the nullity, der Nichts, that are image objects relative to living perception here and 
now, to image subjects, and even to physical images or supports (screens, etc.) represent. They may represent 
homicides, witnessed by others. They may represent fictive homicides. Hence, respectively, the value of 
body- and dash-cam recordings; or the danger of reality TV ‘enactments’ like the present one. Moreover, the 
reference function explains, along with retentional sedimentation of experiences (Husserl’s time 
consciousness) why it is absurd to suppose that ‘we do not see color’. Or why TV viewers ‘saw’ (the 
representation of) kidnappers in Israel and Florence. “The image object is ideal,” urges Husserl. It participates 
in processes analogous to the formation of concepts, of symbols, judgments, and association. But it is not 
always ideal the way a sign is ideal: “the symbolizing function represents something externally” (e.g., signs 
on the highway). The imaging function, by contrast, “exhibits its subject internally, seeing it in the image” 
(PIM 89; Hua 23, 82). This should apply to seeing types as readily as individuals. Thus, we see the internal 
reference to criminals and kidnappers. And for the duration of the images’ legitimation by police or 
specialists, we believe in the internal reference. 
52 Among them, Anne Vigna (co-author of the important work Fábrica de culpables: Florence Cassez y otros 
Casos de la Injusticia Mexicana, 2010), Emmanuelle Steels (Teatro del Engaño), and Leonore Maheux. 
Together, the three wrote the article “La Historia de Florence Cassez: Una Secuestradora [kidnapper] 
Improbable?” in Gente [People], Vol. 40 (2011): 56-63.  
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even pre-reflectively. After all, in the absence of the possibility (or actuality) of some 
conflict, our screen viewing would simply lapse into “perception” because, in its way, it is 
already in part perception (PIM 576; Hua 23, 483).  
We spoke earlier of phenomenology opening the possibility of a critical aesthetics 
of mass and digital media. This is because Husserl did not neglect what he called “aesthetic 
consciousness” (PIM 168 n. 6; Hua 23, 145 n. 1).53 He urged that all art entailed aesthetic 
consciousness, but not all aesthetic consciousness pertained to art (PIM 615, 648; Hua 23, 
513, 538). Important here, we believe, is that, by virtue of their proximity to events, media 
can hold us between image-consciousness and aesthetic consciousness. In aesthetic 
consciousness (as in phantasy), I have no need to take a position on the being or non-being 
of the image object. I am free in short to dispense with its actuality. I may engage, 
moreover, in the “aesthetic position-taking that belongs to feeling [ästhetische 
Stellungnahme des Gemüts]” (521; 441), which occurs when “feeling” or affect is 
deliberately enlivened, in this specific way, through the image approached aesthetically. 
Now, because the affects redounding to aesthetic consciousness abet contemplation—
where a certain sculpture or a portrait induces (aesthetic) delight—it is likely that aesthetic 
consciousness can be brought about through affects like disgust or horror as well (cf. 
poverty-, refugee-, war-reportage, etc.).54 The conjunction of the object and the affects is 
 
53 To wit, “in the psychological attitude,” which is not the same as the phenomenological one, “the appearance 
is an object; in the aesthetic attitude, I do not think about the appearance and do not make it into a theoretical 
object.” At which point Husserl wanders into part of a long-standing ontological dilemma: “but I am not in 
a theoretical attitude in which I am directed toward ‘being’ (true being)…to describe it, or even…to transform 
it…desire it, to take delight in it as something actual [als Wirklichkeit]” (PIM 168 n. 6; Hua 23, 145 n. 1). As 
in phantasy, aesthetic consciousness neither needs nor mobilizes a positing act [setzendes Meinen]. I am not 
concerned with whether it is real or not. And by default, it is real, as-if real, for me in the time(s) of my 
witnessing it.  
54 The relationship between affects and feelings appears to be one of degree in Husserl. The ego may bathe 
in an affect even while it remains “deaf to it” (Hua 11, 363). A feeling arises through an affection of the ego, 
with “a turning toward” the presumptive object, whatever it may be. In so far as some object, here aesthetic, 
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noteworthy here because aesthetic experience requires neither clear object depiction nor 
depends on the tensions Husserl observed as conditions of reflective image consciousness. 
We watch a play, he argued, which inserts us into a world of its own, a world of illusion. 
It is a “pure perceptual figment” (PIM 617; Hua 23, 516), yet we are there for it, we 
“succumb [unterliegen]” to it (617; 516). Thus when an artwork is “realistic,” notably as 
narrative, it deploys its own as-if realistic universe, making us feel as if we were witnessing 
a specific social world at a given time (PIM 652-653; Hua 23, 540-541). When it is 
“idealistic,” that world will be imbued with values and norms. In those cases, again, we 
need not tend to take a stance on the reality or unreality of the image object. 
Drama, like much media narrative, “presents an image” here and now. It is Schein 
and semblance, yet do we not often contemplate it from within “aesthetic consciousness,” 
with its existence (provisionally, even delectably) suspended? Realistic art of all sorts 
comes arguably close to televised news: we have for horizons the particular city, the 
circumstances, the actors. We obtain an ‘ideal’ dimension, with the addition of 
commentary, which contributes normativity and values. Watching TV news, we feel as if 
we are witnessing a given social order, which may appear, or not, to be our own (PIM 652; 
Hua 23, 540-541). This was clearly the case in the SWAT raid, despite the fact that the 
ranch house was replaced by a small shed, and even though the alleged secuestradores had 
been arrested and tortured the day before the TV montage. In such cases, we cannot neatly 
separate perceiving-, image-, and aesthetic consciousness. They interweave in ‘passive’ 
media spectatorship as readily as in everyday life. This complex conception of 
 
is constituted, a new feeling [Gefühl] may arise in passivity. It will belong to “the intentionality of feeling 
[Fühlen] which exhibits a novel intentionality” (Hua 31, 5). Thus, the affect, the object, and the feeling 
interpenetrate with the latter two flowing out of an affect or direction of attention.  
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consciousness means that it is only under critical scrutiny (and for the purpose of 
epistemological analysis) that the ‘here and now’ and the ‘as-if’ can be clearly segregated. 
By 1918, in line with the development of genetic phenomenology, Husserl would conclude, 
“It is doubtful whether there is such a thing as a completely pure phantasy” (PIM 610; Hua 
23, 509).55 He did not here take the step that Merleau-Ponty would take in 1955, by 
asserting the converse, viz., that intersubjective reality was shot through by phantasy. 
Although, as Bernet recalls, Husserl came to wonder whether there was something like a 
pure perception as well.56  
While already present in aesthetic consciousness, an ‘as-if’ characterizes phantasy 
presentations in Husserl. Like memory, phantasy is an act presentation, but unlike lived 
perception (Gegenwärtigung), it is a re-presentation or presentification 
(Vergegenwärtigung), with memory pursuing the mnemonic act to revive its memory 
object, and phantasy freely rearranging the objects sedimented in perceptual memories. 
Now, if watching electronic and digital media involves elements of the ‘as-if’, and thus 
phantasy—even as we are presented ‘live’ with people and situations—then this is because 
it is the specific quality of phantasy objects to mean other ones; once again, they are like 
image representatives [Bildrepräsentant] (PIM 31-34, 531; Hua 23, 30-34, 448). The ‘live’ 
person and the meant person may correspond intimately, or not. It may even be challenging 
 
55 We abbreviate our discussion of the modifications that genetic phenomenology proposed to the analyses 
of the lectures of 1904-1905. It is not that they are unimportant. It is, rather, that many of the categories 
introduced already in Husserl’s static approach prove valuable to am aesthetics of media production. A longer 
article would explore Husserl’s abandonment of mental images and his rapprochement between acts of 
memory and phantasy as reproductive consciousness and nested consciousness (memory of a memory, etc.). 
For a discussion of pure phantasy and the ability of the Ego or ‘I’ to “split itself” and inhabit two worlds 
largely at the same time, see Marco Cavallaro, “The Phenomenon of Ego-splitting in Husserl’s 
Phenomenology of Pure Phantasy,” Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 2016, DOI: 
10.1080.00071771.2016.1250436. Consulted 4 March 2021. 
56 See UCHF 340 and note 8 supra.  
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to determine their relative compatibility. When considered together with idealizing 
tendencies, and the mobilization of interests and affects, the meaning or pointing-toward 
intrinsic to image representatives provides them with a certain solidity (even be it 
phantasmatic solidity), especially when what we are ‘seeing’ also points toward mnemonic 
types—kidnappers, criminals, dangerous rebels or terrorists. 
Yet what carries ‘realistic’ news video still closer to phantasy is that, outside of 
public television or personally edited re-broadcasts, the presentations are continually 
intersected by advertisements.57 In the latter, a smallish world is constituted—we can even 
be able to divine its apperceptive horizons, if and when we recognize them.58 However, 
like phantasy, the advertisement images need not signify anything epistemologically 
thematizable. In other words, if advertising images mean something, then it is often 
‘idealistic’: they point to and elicit values, desires, wishes, or all of these. There is no clear 
distinction here between the image object and the image subject. I do not have to go looking 
for the ‘real’ Tesla or the elegantly dressed model to drift into that partial world, which is 
part of Husserl’s definition of phantasy. More intriguing, he would puzzle over the situation 
of phantasy image(s), having questioned arguments that they are simply ‘in mind’ or just 
‘in the world’ (PIM 18-20; Hua 23, 16-18). If that leaves hanging the question of where 
they are, the likely response is that there is no ‘where’ there. Nevertheless, the harassing 
rhythms of advertisements in news (and other programs) have a peculiar effect on the 
“actuality” of the news by exerting a phantasmatic pull on its putative realism. It is not so 
 
57 See note 48 supra. 
58 See Bernet, IORI 137-138. 
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easy for a viewer to shift between fifteen minutes of televised image objects and phantasy 
image objects targeting her values, yearnings, or even her sense of personal worthiness. 
This is a problem for news in cases like Cassez-Vallarta. Indeed, it is not simply 
because they interrupt the flow of a program that we find ways to eliminate ads, or seek 
media filtering them (at one time this was internet news versus corporate media news). We 
resist the violence done to consciousness in the modal shift that the ads impose, even if we 
are not reflectively aware of it. The crucial point thus concerns the impact, on viewers, of 
this unremitting juxtaposition. It creates more (or less!) than a side-by-side ‘coexistence’ 
of image objects. 
As Husserl’s thought evolved, he backed away from what was called the “image 
theory” of image consciousness and phantasy.59 In Ideas I, he argued for an unbridgeable 
gap between perception and image consciousness.60 But one difficulty concerned 
inspection of a presentation; that is, our attempt to re-present it to ourselves, which initially 
occurred thanks to the interposition of an image mediation, as according to image or 
representation theories. Such a conception of representation still recurs to the concept of 
mental images. For Husserl image theory vitiated the ‘in person’ directness of perception 
and presentification. Despite this, a certain mediation remained crucial to him since both 
memory and phantasy entail some kind of functional intermediary. The latter did not need 
 
59 Shum rightly points out that “Husserl has good reasons for excluding picture-thing from the structure of 
phantasy…Firstly, Husserl is…methodologically opposed to being drawn into psychologistic speculations 
regarding mental images…Secondly, when I imagine a landscape, the landscape does not appear to be 
framed…within a separate physical object….This differentiates imagining a landscape from walking into an 
art gallery and viewing a painting of it” (EIHA 222). Although the picture-thing is thus absent in imagination 
or phantasy, it is unclear whether prolonged TV viewing might not bring about a rapprochement between the 
moving sonorous images and their concurrent phantasies.  
60 Husserl, Ideas, Vol. I (Husserliana III), trans. F. Kersten (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1982), 
93: “a picture-consciousness or a sign-consciousness must not be substituted for perception.” 
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to be iconic. By maintaining his distinction between types of intentional acts (perceiving 
directly, remembering, anticipating, imagining) and the contents of these acts, Husserl 
defined the mediation at work in memory in terms of the act of casting back and revivifying 
a past event—which forthwith delivered the object or contents (PIM 237; Hua 23, 198).61 
Phantasy certainly had its mnemonic dimension, but operated with greater freedom. In 
memory as in phantasy, what thus appears is not something present that would serve as the 
representative for something absent (image subject) (PIM 93; Hua 23, 86). Therefore, again 
no presence requirement is experienced and the presentifying act “relates,” in phantasy, 
“just as straightforwardly (einfältig) [to its object] as [it does] in perception” (PIM 92; Hua 
23, 85).  
Combined with his new mediation through acts, Husserl’s revised conception of 
phantasy and memory presentification implied that no clear criterion might be found to 
distinguish, at the level of the acts themselves, between lived sensation and phantasy 
sensation (PIM 136-137; Hua 124-125).62 Of course, with sensation come other types of 
affect, though Husserl recurred sparingly to examples of particular emotions. Henceforth, 
image consciousness stood alone. By contrast, presenting and presentifying acts, i.e., 
perception and memory/phantasy, drew closer to each other. This may be why televised 
images—though they belong firstly to image consciousness and not to perception—provide 
 
61 “The act of remembering…is itself a ‘recollective re-presenting’ of the earlier act of perceiving and also 
signifies…memory of this act of perceiving.” We owe this important insight firstly to remarks by the 
translator, John Barnett Brough. See PIM LVI, LXIV. 
62 Husserl promised to sort out differences between phantasy and perceptual sensations. At the level of their 
contents, they could share comparable intensities. At the level of their acts, phantasy predictably lacked the 
position of ‘this is real here and now’. But he would add, “beyond the differences explained…we will 
immediately recognize that the physically mediated appearances [physisch vermittelten Erscheinungen] and 
the perceptual appearances [Wahrnehmungserscheinungen] are of entirely the same sort” (PIM 136 n. 30; 
Hua 23, 124 n. 2). 
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un-mediated consciousness of objects that may or may not be elsewhere. That is, they are 
‘live’, ‘on site’, and attested by the reporter. They are both presentation and 
presentification. And they motivate both memory associations (e.g., the widespread 
awareness of kidnapping as a social scourge) and phantasies (‘I might become a victim’).63 
When they are repeatedly broadcast over days, a nascent lived memory congeals, 
retentionally streaming back from my living present to what my consciousness durably 
retains from relatively proximal experiences. Moreover, with electronic sound and images 
perfectly concerted, we vividly ‘perceive’, and then just as vividly perceive anew, as if 
(and ‘as-if’) the SWAT team raid were still ongoing today.  
It was considerations like this that impelled Husserl to modify his approach to 
phantasy and argue that, while the act of memory reinvigorates the experience of an object 
or event, the act of phantasy operates like a perception itself (PIM 531; Hua 23, 448). A 
perception gives me a house from an angle, under some kind of light, at some distance. So 
too the phantasy, albeit in the mode of a quasi-perception—again, without my taking a 
position on the actuality or existence of the house. Phantasy would thus be original; the as-
if giving of an object or event itself (PIM 696; Hua 23, 579). “If, in phantasying, I perform 
a coherent act of harmoniously intuitive phantasying…I thereby construct an object as-if 
in the manner of an original quasi-perceptual as-if giving of the object itself. And this 
object as-if is originally given here (ursprünglich gegeben)…and is nothing else in the 
 
63 Criminologists Greer and Reiner remind us that, since World War II, media news emphasis on violent 
crime, including homicide (and kidnapping), “feature vastly more frequently than the property offences that 
predominate in official statistics.” Moreover, since the late 1960s “crime is represented increasingly as an 
all-pervasive threat, not an abnormal, one-off intrusion into a stable order. Linked to this is the increasing 
prevalence in film of police heroes…” in “Mediated Mahem,” emphasis added. 
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grasping coming from the Ego (which is an actual and not a modified grasping)” (696; 578-
579).64  
We would argue that the quasi-perception and as-if giving are limited neither to our 
subjective phantasies nor to advertising solicitations. Rather, they appear to be the essence 
of neoliberal media reportage. It is thus as if, with his own revised conception of phantasy 
with regard to perception, Husserl accounted for the relative un-situatableness of televised 
and digital media ‘presentations’. Indeed, perhaps one of the clearest crystallizations of 
this rapprochement of perception and phantasy is the meme. Stated otherwise, a meme—
immediately both perception and image—denotes a kind of intentional act, a complex 
synthetic association drawing on both memory and opening to phantasy. The sensory 
content of the meme matters ultimately less than the act that it comes to denote: I perceive 
it and I go in search of the memory act that associates it with previous perceptions, through 
similarity or not. Consider the many memes involving Cassez, the most extreme of which 
showed her face from a montage image, with the words “Muerte a Florence Cassez” (i.e., 
image object, presentifications, and phantasy interwoven). 
Husserl would emphasize that to “every sensuous-content there corresponds a 
sensuous phantasm,” like directly sensed ‘red’ and its accompaniment in presentification. 
Such accompaniments become densely sedimented through repetition, and it is hardly 
surprising that, as the tabloids obsessively reprinted Cassez’s facial expressions (from 
desperation to scowling), the phantasms multiplied along with the “sensuous contents.” 
And they associated through flowing retentional consciousness. She thus oscillated 
 
64 Note the repetitions of “quasi-” and “as-if,” here. This may be for the sake of clarity, but the danger to 




between a real person—a rather rare ‘perception’ until 2013—a symbol of French brutality 
toward Mexicans,65 an accomplice kidnapper, and ultimately an icon, a fitting meme. 
Not unlike the phantasm that is both present and not present, corporate television 
news is intercalated with advertisements that are vivid yet somehow altered (cf. image 
object consciousness). “Only indirect reflection bestows on [the phantasm] an acquired 
present [eine akquirierte Gegenwart]” (PIM 87; Hua 23, 81), which is also the case of TV 
news. Through indirect reflection, I can attempt to set it in my present. But the reflection 
need not be critical; perhaps it need not be explicitly conscious. A phantasm may, through 
some affective force—say, anxiety, indignation, or resentment—be inserted into my 
present.66 To wit, “here are the faces of kidnappers; do you see it in them?” And if the 
threat of kidnapping is present to mind, even as an affective horizon, then a French woman 
and her friend may expand the existing image stock of such delincuentes. Though they are 
not there where we are, they can haunt our daily existence. The as-if present slides toward 
the lived present. And Husserl would specify that the phantasy-present be defined as an 
“internal present [innerer Gegenwart]” (PIM 204; Hua 23, 169), as it clearly is, here. 
The idea of an “internal present” enriches the as-if or the quasi-modalities we 
discussed earlier. It appears to address the dilemma of actual perception segregated from 
phantasy versus actual perception laying close to phantasy. The internal present came with 
 
65 English-speakers forget that the French largely invaded Mexico twice. The first time between 1838 and 
1839, when the French blockaded Mexican ports. The context was complaints by French nationals about 
danger to property due to unrest. The second French intervention, under the Second Empire, lasted six years 
(1861-1867). Aiming at hegemony in Mexico, it overturned the economic reforms of Benito Juárez with the 
collaboration of the Mexican Catholic Church, local nobles, and some of the bourgeoisie. The memory has 
survived longer in the Mexican social imaginary than in the French one. 
66 For an enriching discussion of affective forces [affektive Kräfte], and the way they preserve certain 
retentions, allowing them to emerge anew in conscious associations, see Hua 11 “Assoziation” (Chapter 2, 
§§ 32-35). This approaches the sedimentation of affects, affective saliency, and degrees of affective force 
from a specifically genetic phenomenological angle.  
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a revised conception of sensation. On the basis of his 1911 reworking of the time 
consciousness lectures, Husserl expanded his inquiry into levels of consciousness: the 
experiencing or absolute consciousness; the experience constituted therein, and the 
intentional object of experience (PIM 397; Hua 23, 326). While the first and the second, 
experiencing and experience, were distinct, they were essentially inseparable—despite the 
fact that the experiencing per se was not itself an experience (395; 325). Accordingly, 
sensation—earlier conceived earlier on the model of a sort of material whose continuous 
change impelled the flow of consciousness—became consciousness itself. No longer the 
source of our reality index, sensation was “the original consciousness of immanent time,” 
and indeed, the impressional or “original consciousness of acts and contents as temporally 
extended” (307; 251). As such, phantasy sensations enjoyed a corresponding elevation. If 
“‘consciousness’ consists of consciousness through and through,” then both perception and 
phantasy (or sensation-lived and sensation-phantasized) are consciousness (PIM 323-324 
Hua 23, 265).  
The rapprochement between perception and phantasy was thus cinched. The 
modification of perception in phantasy, denoted by the as-if and the quasi-, were 
consciousness modified. And, because all experiences are constituted sensuously or 
impressionally in internal consciousness (PIM 369; Hua 23, 307), they could all be 
presentified and, correlatively, phantasized. It is not clear whether Husserl abandoned the 
concept of an object’s ‘as-if’ appearance, much less that of the nullity of image 
consciousness and the semblance of phantasy. Yet his move to ‘all is consciousness’, with 
a host of modalizations, bonded phantasy and perception in a way important for 
understanding media presentation and re-presentation (presentification)—in the present 
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case, media re-presentation-as-presentation. When understood as vivid and correlative 
with directly lived sensation, accompanying phantasy sensations were the re-productive 
counterpart of impressional internal consciousness (PIM 683; Hua 23, 566-567). 
Moreover, they were, given their respective modification, also impressional. Phantasy 
sensations thus played an analogous role in experience. It was the context, above all, that 
distinguished them (PIM 368; Hua 23, 306-307).  
The “phantasm in the act’s phantasy” is what TV Azteca and Televisa offered their 
viewers; not really as-if, but as here and now. No doubt it is more than Mexican media that 
engage in this strategy. Televised news depends on it, especially if it would also deliver its 
spectators to advertisers who require an audience receptive, affectively and attentionally, 
to their solicitations. It remains that the analogous role of phantasy in experience does not 
warrant a direct assimilation with televised images and phantasy. Nevertheless, the power 
of media news, of televised facts—and the disconcerting quasi-worlds elaborated by social 
media—is well explained by this phenomenological approach to consciousness as 
presentation, presentification, aesthetic, and affective. Also elucidated is the persistence of 
belief in the guilt of the accused, which only turned around in 2012, when Cassez’s case 
went before the Suprema Corte de Justicia (SCJN). For those events too were televised… 
VI. Perception, Trauma, and the Existential Category 
By taking a leap that Husserl reserved to his unpublished Ideas II and incorporating 
insights from psychology—from Gestalt and from psychoanalysis—Merleau-Ponty 
expanded Husserl’s approach to perception, constitution, and passivity. To do justice to his 
contribution exceeds the range of this essay. Yet if we allow that both the on-going threat 
of kidnapping and violation, and the presentation of the capture of ‘criminals’ constitute 
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trauma—even minor trauma—then Husserl and Merleau-Ponty’s argument for a massively 
embodied and intersubjective consciousness proves illuminating. What Merleau-Ponty 
always argued was the subtlety of perception and “its kinship with a whole series of 
givens,” looks to us like Husserl’s mature rapprochements between perception and 
phantasy, actual sensation and phantasy-sensation. The as-if or, better, the modifications 
of consciousness, hearken to Merleau-Ponty’s existential deposited in us through 
perception…and trauma. In sedimenting, it metaphorically vibrates67 and radiates 
connections with new perceptions and phantasies. “In fact, this is not subtle, it is massive,” 
added Merleau. In later years, Husserl would likely have agreed. And this helps to situate 
the troublesome power of live news narratives that present trauma and other disturbing 
situations. It is thus as absurd to segregate perception and phantasy as it is to suppose that 
there are no interstices between and no discrimination among the modalizations of 
consciousness. For critical phenomenology, Husserl’s distinctions give us tools with which 
to do so. They also open paths toward answering the two questions we posed at the outset 
concerning our vulnerability to mass imagery and social media, and the persistence belief 
in staged narratives like those ‘presenting’ Vallarta and Cassez’s culpability. Merleau-
Ponty expanded the embodiment of affects, in the mode of existential trauma. In an age of 
global neoliberalism, the political value of a critical phenomenological aesthetics should 
not be underestimated.  
 
 
67 It vibrates with the force (affektive Kräfte is Husserl’s term) of protentions or anticipations, even though 
as retentional, as past, they have been “filled” with content. That is, the act of anticipating—especially 
anticipating trauma—is not eliminated even though we have lived through what filled it, i.e., what followed, 
experientially, the anticipation. This idea comes to Husserl in the 1918 Bernau manuscripts on time 




At the time of this writing Vallarta’s health has stabilized. After fifteen years, he 
remains in Puente Grande. He has never had a trial, despite Judge Sánchez Cordero’s recent 
urging that he be released. Garcia Luna was imprisoned by U.S. authorities on charges of 
drug trafficking and false testimony. Palomino is under investigation by the Fiscalía 
General de la República for money laundering. English-speaking cultures appear to live in 
what one journalist called the “empire of illusion.” The human rights organization, En 
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